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Abstract 
This paper presents an introduction to a new approach to our understanding of peak 
performance and dysfunctional performance in sport - Correction theory. Correction 
theory, based within a control theory (W. Powers, 1973) and dynamical systems 
perspective, assumes that dynamic balance (A state in which a robust complex system 
will self-correct in response to imbalance) underwrites individual functioning. The 
central thesis presented in this paper is that an interdependent relationship exists 
between peak performance and dysfunctional performance in sport. Peak performance 
is, in part, a (corrective) response to dysfunctional performance, and vice versa. An 
overview of correction theory is presented, based on two propositions relating to 
balance. Implications of correction theory for our understanding of sporting 
performance are briefly considered.  
Keywords: dynamic balance, peak performance, correction theory 
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The Psychology of Dynamic Balance and Peak Performance in Sport: Correction 
Theory 
A psychological theory, if it is to be more than a technical makeshift, must 
base itself on the principle of opposition; for without this it could only re-
establish a neurotically unbalanced psyche. There is no balance, no system of 
regulation without opposition. The psyche is just such a self-regulating system 
(Jung, 1966a, p. 61) 
Aphorisms such as success out of failure and triumph over adversity are 
commonplace within sport. One regularly hears coaches and players talk about 
expecting a reaction following defeat, and warning against complacency after victory; 
alluding to a possible interdependent relationship between success and failure rarely 
explored within the academic literature. The pursuit of achieving sustainable peak 
performances in competition is arguably one of the defining goals and challenges for 
elite athletes (Nesti, Littlewood, O’Halloran, Eubank, & Richardson, 2012), and for 
those who seek to support them. Yet variation in performance is a certainty for 
athletes, including at elite levels, making success and failure an inevitable part of elite 
athletes lived experience (Gilbourne and Richardson, 2006).  
Privette (1981) defined peak performance as “behaviour in any activity that 
transcends what normally could be expected in that situation” (p. 51). Based on this 
definition, peak performance refers to a higher level of functioning within any given 
activity (Privette, 1983), which is by definition quantitatively and/or qualitatively 
different to a “normal” level of performance.  
The qualitative nature of the subjective experiences associated with peak 
performance in sport has attracted significant attention in the literature (i.e., 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Jackson, 1992, Privette, 1981; Ravizza, 1977, 1984). Many 
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of these findings suggest that peak performance is an ego-transcending experience 
(Maslow, 1968) consistent with the construct of flow (Young & Pain, 1999), which 
Jackson et al (2001) described as an optimal mental state theoretically associated with 
optimal athletic performance. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) identified 9 characteristics of 
flow, including total concentration, a sense of personal control, and the merging of 
action and awareness. Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi (1999) give the following account 
of a runner reportedly in a state of flow: “I felt very in control…I felt very strong. I 
was able to run as I had planned…I felt really focused. I just felt like, you know, like 
athletes say, ‘It clicked’; it felt great the whole way” (p. 4). 
However research into the association between flow and performance in sport 
settings reveals an inconsistent picture (see Schuler & Brunner, 2009). Even if one is 
to assume that flow is positively associated to performance, research has suggested 
that it is not experienced frequently by athletes (Jackson, 1992) despite a relatively 
high proportion of athletes reporting to have perceived control of factors affecting 
flow occurrence (see Swann, Keegan, Piggott, & Crust, 2012, for a review). Ravizza 
(1977, 1984), however, found that most athletes’ interviewed reported that peak 
performance states were involuntary and temporary in nature. 
 Swann et al (2012) concluded that whilst we have a fairly comprehensive 
understanding of what it is like to experience flow, “research should move from such 
description to explaining flow” (p. 819). If one is not to confuse description with 
explanation, it is likely that any explanation of optimal mental states will require an 
approach which moves away from static taxonomy, or abstraction, towards 
acknowledging the dynamic, temporal nature of performance itself. 
We suggest that theoretical attempts to understand peak performance in sport 
have been impaired by focusing primarily on its qualitative nature, based on a 
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between-person level of analysis. A between-person level of analysis allows 
researchers to assess cross-sectional (single time point) variation on a particular 
measure; and has typically been used to capture the subjective experience of peak 
performance states such as flow (i.e., Jackson, 1992; Ravizza, 1977). However 
Vancouver, Thompson, & Williams (2001) proposed that within-person level of 
analysis is better able to conceptualize change in performance levels over time, and 
thus allow for the possibility of temporal precedence to be established (Curran & 
Bauer, 2011). For example, Mizruchi (1991) studied National Basketball Association 
playoff data between 1947 and 1982, and found that “winning the previous game 
increased the probability of losing the present game by about 12%” (p.186). Mizruchi 
(1991) hypothesized that in team competition, success breed’s failure because it can 
lead to overconfidence which reduces the urgency for future success. Furthermore, 
Mizruchi (1991) also suggested that prior failure could increase the likelihood of 
success because it increases the motivation for achievement in the future.  
We introduce a new theoretical framework with the aim of capturing the 
dynamic, temporal nature of performance variation in sport – correction theory. 
Correction theory is based within a dynamic systems perspective, in an attempt to 
capture the variable, complex nature of athletic performance. When judged from this 
perspective, the individual is viewed as a non-linear open system of which one of the 
defining characteristics is the spontaneous emergence of self-organization (Kauffman, 
1995; Strogatz, 2003). Furthermore, notions of isolation and prediction become 
largely redundant, given the idea of indeterminacy is a key feature of many open 
system analyses of cognition and behavior (Schall, 2004).  
In relation to the development of research and theory within the sport sciences 
over the last 3 decades, Balague, Torrents, Hristovski, Davids & Araújo (2013) 
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observed that a mechanistic view of human organisms has dominated the 
development of research and theory within the sport sciences over the last 3 decades. 
Given the tendency within sport science to overlook the dynamic organism-
environment relationship in favor of reductive internal (mental) mechanisms (Davids 
& Araújo, 2010), Balague et al (2013) suggested that complex systems approaches 
provide a more ecological basis on which to conceptualize sport related phenomena. 
Furthermore, we believe that a dynamic systems approach is a promising way to 
develop theory with regard to the psychological basis for sporting performance. 
 Correction theory also utilizes control theory (W. Powers, 1973), which is 
based within a class of theories referred to as the cybernetic-systems paradigm 
(Vancouver, 2000, 2005). Control theory, emerging out of a non-linear dynamic view 
of human nature, theorizes that control is exerted on the system based on the concept 
of negative feedback, which W. Powers (1973) viewed as the “central and 
determining factor in all observed behavior” (p. 44). A negative feedback loop is 
described by Vancouver (2005) as “one that through its operation reduces the 
difference between the level of a variable and the reference (i.e., goal) level for the 
variable” (p. 49). Critically, according to control theory, feedback occurs on a 
perceptual rather than behavioral level wherein the purpose of the system is to reduce 
error between a desired state (i.e., performance goal) and the current perceived level 
(W. Powers, 1973).  
Based on these perspectives we introduce two constructs which form the basis 
of correction theory: 
 Dynamic balance - A state in which a robust complex system will self-correct 
in response to imbalance (resulting from perceived variation/challenge) in 
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order to maintain functional organisation; or, the individual and coordinated 
expression of balance and imbalance1  
 Correction - The response of the system to a source of imbalance or challenge 
Correction theory views the individual as a system, and assumes that dynamic 
balance underwrites individual functioning. It will be argued that such a view of 
balance allows a new perspective on our understanding of peak performance and 
performance variation in sport. The central thesis is that we can no longer view peak 
performance2 and dysfunctional performance3 as unrelated occurrences. Thus, instead 
of viewing dysfunctional performance as an anathema, it paradoxically forms a 
necessary part of or understanding of peak performance in sport. Peak performance 
and dysfunctional performance are viewed as two sides of the same naturally 
occurring phenomenon; a dynamic self-correcting system. The focus in this paper is 
to provide an introductory sketch; some of the details will warrant further discussion 
and clarification. 
Balance – Conceptual meaning 
																																																								
1	The later is based on Kelso’s (2008) notion of meta-stability, which is described as 
"the simultaneous realization of two competing tendencies: the tendency of the 
components to couple together and the tendency for the components to express their 
intrinsic independent behavior” (p. 186). 
2	For consistency, the term peak performance will be used in this paper to describe 
any performance which is significantly above what can normally be expected 
(Privette, 1981). 
3 Conceptualized as a below average performance. 
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The ubiquitous nature of the term balance opposes a universal definition. The 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Soanes & Stevenson [Eds.], 2008) lists seven 
definitions for balance (noun), not including related terms such as balanced and on 
balance. Definitions include “a counteracting weight or force” and “mental or 
emotional stability” (p. 100). The metaphor of the weighing scales has endured, and is 
reflected in Aristotle’s golden mean, and Camus’ philosophy of limits. 
Metaphysically, balance can also be considered in terms of recognition and/or 
acceptance of both sides of a particular dichotomy, and their inter-relation. In the last 
century, Jung developed a model of the psyche governed by the principle of dynamic 
opposition (Stevens, 1990) between opposing, yet complimentary systems. When 
reflecting on the lessons from history with respect to the boundaries of human 
existence, van Deurzen (2002) suggested that the “struggle between opposites” (p.52) 
is one the defining characteristics, in which the existential goal is too avoid one-
sidedness. 
Considered dynamically, balance cannot be seen as a stable ideal, but a 
constant shifting of sand, taking on new forms. In relation to a dynamic self-
organising (open) system, absolute balance is a misnomer which doesn’t allow and 
account for imbalance, and therefore variation and change. Thus for a dynamically 
balanced system, and in light of Kelso’s (2008) notion of meta-stability, balance 
necessitates imbalance, and imbalance necessitates balance. 
Although the idea of the complementarity of opposites is a new departure for 
sport psychology, it has lineage within the parent discipline of psychology (e.g., 
Jung’s depth psychology), as well as in the natural sciences (see Kelso & Engstrøm, 
2006) and philosophy (e.g., Heraclitus’s notion of the unity of opposites). In 
reviewing such developments, Kelso & Engstrøm  (2006) suggested that Neils Bohr’s 
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notion of complimentarity could be a starting point to consider broader human 
concerns. Kelso & Engstrøm (2006) introduced the term complementary nature, 
which they defined as “a set of mutually dependent principles responsible for the 
genesis, existence, and evolution of the universe relating to or suggestive of 
complimenting, completing, or perfecting relationships and being complimented in 
return” (Kelso & Engstrøm, 2006, p. 39). This definition implies that the existence of 
the universe, and that which inhabits it, is dependent, and defined by its ability to 
organise itself based on the complimentarity of opposites. Thus implying that the 
study of any phenomenon is incomplete without a consideration of its relationship 
with its complimentary opposite.  
Balance and sport performance 
Within elite sport, temporal variation in performance is a reality for all 
athletes. This paper will argue that these different performance levels are inter-related, 
and that peak performances are dependent on psychological and systemic sources of 
imbalance within elite sport.  
For example, Balague (1999) has observed that elite athletes have to make 
major sacrifices in other aspects of their lives in order to fulfill the demands of their 
sport, as well as being required to give an extreme level of commitment to the activity 
itself. Similarly, Miller and Kerr (2002) have suggested that there is a cost of pursuing 
performance excellence at the expense of the overall development of the person, 
which they suggest could be due to over-identification with their athletic role. 
From a more philosophical perspective, the work of Loland (2000) considered 
the effect of the logic of quantifiable progress, whereby progress is characterized by 
quantification of performance, and the breaking of records. The flaw that Loland 
identifies within this logic is that the goal of being citius, altius, fortius (faster, higher, 
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stronger) doesn’t take into account our limitations as biological beings. Our 
“phylogenetic potential is stable” (Loland, 2000, p. 43), but this is ultimately 
incompatible with our insatiable appetite for improvement. Whilst peak performance 
is a defining goal of elite sport, the possibility of continuous peak performances 
appears an elusive dream. Ravizza (1977) found that peak performances are viewed 
by athletes as the exception rather than the norm, suggesting that athletes rarely 
perform to their full potential. Furthermore, Loland (2000) suggested that there could 
be a human cost for the pursuit of continual improvement, including the use of doping 
and genetic engineering within sport.  
Culbertson (2005) suggested that such logic also has psychological 
implications for the athlete that can be encountered on an almost daily basis. 
Culberson argued that to take part in record sports where quantifiable progress is the 
goal, promotes the need for self-deception on the part of the athlete. Drawing upon 
Sartre’s notion of bad faith, Culberson (2005) suggested that there is a fundamental 
contradiction between the endless pursuit of records (striving for transcendence), and 
human facticity. The latter he describes as “their past, their current situation, and their 
body – in short, that which is a given fact of their existence” (Culbertson, 2005, p. 
67). 
An athlete in pursuit of progress denies this contradiction yet is fully aware of 
it. The athlete believes that continual progress is possible (and conducts his or 
her life entirely in accordance with this belief) yet knows that it is not. This 
self-deception is bad faith. (Culbertson, 2005, p. 73) 
In short, for those who strive for perfection, bad faith or imbalance is the price 
that most elite athletes will pay. Miller & Kerr (2002) alluded to this imbalance when 
they suggested that performance excellence is often at the expense of personal 
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excellence, compromising the development of the whole person, and arguably 
increasing the likelihood of athlete burnout and/or psychopathology. This imbalance 
has also been considered within research investigating the deleterious effects of 
perfectionism in sport (e.g., Gould, Udry, Tuffey, & Loehr, 1996; Lemyre, Hall, & 
Roberts, 2008). What hasn’t been considered is the possibility that notions of balance 
and imbalance, in relation to a dynamically balanced system, might provide a new 
theoretical framework to help develop our understanding of performance variation 
and peak performance in sport.  
Correction theory 
The psyche is a self-regulating system that maintains its equilibrium just as the 
body does. Every process that goes too far calls forth compensations, and 
without these there would be neither a normal metabolism nor a normal 
psyche. In this sense we can take the theory of compensation as a basic law of 
psychic behavior (Jung, 1966b, p. 153). 
The genesis of correction theory is in part indebted to Jung’s dynamic view of 
the psyche, which assumes that the regulatory function of opposites underpins psychic 
functioning (Stevens, 1990). Jung based his theory of compensation on the principle 
of equivalence which states that “for any given quantity of energy expended or 
consumed in bringing a certain condition, an equal quantity of the same or another 
form of energy will appear elsewhere” (Jung, 1960, p. 18).4 
It is worth noting that the principle of compensation has been discussed in 
relation to sport psychology by Ravizza (2002). Drawing on humanistic and 
																																																								
4	See Jung (1960) for a more detailed outline of his ideas concerning the energetic 
standpoint.	
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existential psychology to explain his role with professional athletes over many years, 
Ravizza claims that teaching skills that allow performers to compensate and adjust 
mentally has been a cornerstone of his applied work. The notion of compensation, or 
correction, is also an implicit element in W. Powers (1973) control theory.  
Correction theory is based on the central assumption that dynamic balance is a 
naturally occurring phenomenon which occurs due to the necessity of robust, stable 
complex systems to self-organize through correction. Two associated propositions 
will be considered in relation to sport, as well as with respect to the implications for 
performance variation and peak performance in sport. 
Proposition one  
Challenges will require corrections in order to maintain the robustness of a 
dynamically balanced system. 
We view a correction as the response (accommodation) of the system to a 
source of imbalance or challenge; the mechanism of which is to retain function, and 
allow for the required oscillations driven by the tension between balance and 
imbalance.  
With few exceptions, corrections are evident in athletes who continually strive 
for peak performance within their sport, and can present on different levels (i.e., 
physical, psychological, interpersonal etc), but will typically manifest in the form of a 
cost to another aspect of the athletes’ lived world (Balague, 1999). These costs can 
include constraints placed on social life, added pressures in relationships with 
coaches, family and friends, and physical fatigue. In psychological terms, costs may 
involve emotions such as anxiety and anger, and cognitions about failed expectations, 
confidence issues and doubt (Nesti, 2011). Whether a correction can manifest in the 
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form of a performance correction is yet to be explored in the literature, but some 
potential evidence will be considered later in the paper. 
Whilst an athlete might not show any outward consequences of their 
endeavour, the necessity for redress means they, and/or others, will almost always pay 
a personal price. This interrelation between the person and athlete makes it 
unsurprising that an increasing number of applied sport psychologists report using a 
holistic approach to consultancy (e.g., Anderson, 2009; Bond, 2002; Friesen & Orlick, 
2010; Henschen, 2001; Lindsay, Breckon, Thomas, & Maynard, 2007; Nesti, 2004; 
Ravizza, 2002; Simons & Anderson, 1995; Tod & Bond, 2010).  
Proposition two  
Imbalance is a requisite aspect of dynamic balance.  
Human systems are continuously being exposed to external influences, 
resulting in a dynamic form of self-organisation (Bertalanffy, 1950). At any given 
point in time, a dynamically balanced system will be in a state of imbalance, but is 
considered robust as long as it maintains the ability to correct itself. On this basis, 
negation rather than imbalance is diametrically opposed to balance.  Imbalance 
represents a challenge to the balanced system but not a total negation of the existing 
state. Therefore imbalance represents an open system in a state of flux, but the system 
is (paradoxically) considered balanced because of its inherent tendency to correct 
itself, and its capability to adjust. Rose (1997) recognised this paradox in observing 
that the stability and self-organisation of an open system is dependent on the 
individual components being in a state of constant flux: “Change is virtually the only 
constancy. Stasis is death” (Rose, 1997, p. 140). If the stability of an open system is 
dependent on continual change, or variation, this has important implications for our 
understanding of the nature of performance variation and peak performance in sport. 
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Implication one 
It provides a theoretical basis for observation that peak performances are 
intermittent and temporary in nature (Ravizza, 1977, 1984). A central tenet of this 
approach is that there is a dynamic tension between the tendency of the system to self-
organize in order to remain robust (balance), and the desire to achieve continual peak 
performances (imbalance). On this basis, peak performance states by their very nature 
are considered inherently unstable and therefore unsustainable. 
Implication two 
It supports the observation that athletes have limited conscious control over 
the psychological states associated with peak performance (Jackson, 1992). Jackson 
(1992) gives the following account of a figure skater commenting on the perceived 
controllability of flow: 
Yeah, I think you can increase it…It’s not a conscious effort. If you try to do 
it, it’s not going to work. I think maybe through trying you turn off the switch 
so it can’t happen…I think there are things, factors you can lessen, to make it 
happen more often. I don’t think it is something you can turn on and off like a 
light switch. (p. 174) 
The idea that we misattribute conscious thought as the primary cause of 
behavior, has received considerable support in the psychology literature (see Wegner 
& Wheatley, 1999, for a review). Wegner and Wheatley (1999) conclude that “the 
real causal mechanisms underlying behavior are never present in consciousness. 
Rather, the engines of causation are unconscious mechanisms of mind.” (p. 490). If 
peak performance states are subject to unconscious as well as conscious processes, it 
is likely that deterministic predictability is an impossible dream. When viewed as a 
feature of a complex system, we suggest that peak performance states are an emergent 
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phenomenon; order at the edge of chaos (Kauffman, 1995; Waldrop, 1992), and 
therefore not subject to mechanistic laws. 
Implication three 
It suggests an interdependent relationship between peak performance and 
dysfunctional performance states. As previously stated, corrections are viewed as the 
response of a system to a challenge (proposition 1). Given that the tendency of any 
dynamic system is to maintain its robustness and integrity through self-organization 
(Kelso, 1995), the response to any form of imbalance is to compensate (correct) to 
avoid negation. It is therefore theoretically possible that, in some instances, a 
dysfunctional performance could be, in part, a self-regulatory (involuntary) response 
to peak performance(s); and a peak performance could be, in part, a self-regulatory 
(involuntary) response to dysfunctional performance(s). One would therefore expect 
to find the foundation for a peak performance in the psychological response to 
dysfunctional performance(s); and the seeds of a dysfunction performance in the 
psychological response to peak performance(s).  
Dysfunctional performance and peak performance: An interdependent, circular 
relationship?  
Although correction theory is a new departure for sport psychology, there is a 
growing body of literature which suggests that a circular relationship exists between 
dysfunctional and peak performance states. Silva, Hardy, & Crace (1988) introduced 
two constructs to describe how momentum can be lost or gained. The first is positive 
inhibition, which Silva et al (1998) describe as “the process whereby success may 
actually result in the loss of momentum and thus increase the probability of 
subsequent failure” (p. 346). The second is negative facilitation, “whereby failure 
increases the probability of subsequent success” (p. 347). Cornelius, Silva, Conroy, 
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Petersen (1997) developed the Projected Performance Model, based around these two 
constructs, to explain how shifts in momentum could be related to the perception of 
increased or decreased performance levels. Specifically, the Projected Performance 
Model suggests that performance fluctuations around the mean are in part due 
inhibitory forces (e.g., over-confidence and complacency) when the athlete has a 
positive perception of the performance, and facilitative forces (e.g., increased 
motivation) when the athlete’s perception of the performance is negative (Cornelius et 
al, 1997).  
Poczwardowski and Conroy (2002) interviewed eight elite athletes and eight 
performing artists about their coping responses to success and failure. Interestingly, it 
was found that coping responses to failure included facilitative steps to improve 
future performances. For example, 69% of participants reported enhanced motivation 
after failure; and 69% of participants reported to having learnt from previous failures, 
and had subsequently improved (Poczwardowski and Conroy, 2002). Similarly, in a 
study of academy football players, Sagar, Busch, and Jowett (2010) found that all 
players interviewed, adopted at least one problem-focused coping strategy in response 
to failure, including increased effort and determination to prove their ability.  
Carver (2003) suggested that the feelings associated with things going well on 
a specific task (i.e. winning) can result in a shift of resources to other perceived needs; 
a process Carver (2003) referred to as coasting. In three studies involving multiple 
goal pursuit, Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg (2007) found that positive emotions 
associated with being close to achieving a goal did result in a reallocation of effort 
towards other goals. Similarly, W. Powers (1991) suggested that when an individual 
has optimistic beliefs about their current performance level (i.e., overconfidence), the 
perceived discrepancy between the observed level and desired level diminishes, 
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resulting in less resources being allocated. On the other hand, optimism in relation to 
higher goals being set, results in an increase in effort due to the perceived discrepancy 
between current performance level and goal level (W. Powers, 1991). Thus, according 
to control theory (W. Powers, 1973), it is not psychological variables (e.g., self-
efficacy) themselves which determine the level of effort, but discrepancies between 
perceived current and ideal states. This proposition has been supported in a recent 
study by Woodman, Akehurst, Hardy, & Beattie (2010) who found that inducing self-
doubt in participants perceived ability, resulted in higher performances on a skipping 
task. Woodman et al (2010) concluded that “a decrease in self-confidence (i.e., an 
element of self-doubt) may increase participants’ perceived discrepancy between their 
current performance standard and their goal (potential) standard, which leads them to 
increase on-task effort” (p. 469).  
Even if high levels of motivation are maintained, an athlete’s internal world 
cannot always match the external reality (the desire to win alone is not enough). 
Positive thinking, generally believed to be essential for peak performance, cannot 
control variations in external factors, such as weather, playing surface, and opponents 
("He played better than me. There's not a whole lot more to it."  - British tennis player 
Andy Murray, on his third-round exit to Stanislas Wawrinka in the 2010 US tennis 
open). Such factors will inevitably vary, and so therefore will the performance and the 
outcome. Positive emotions in sport are therefore in themselves unstable because they 
do not entirely reflect all aspects of an athlete’s lived reality (Nesti, 2004). Inevitable 
challenges to this state potentially result in the experience of emotions such as anxiety 
and possibly depression. In turn, subsequent feelings of joy and adulation are duly 
heightened. Similarly, a football coach, who compromises the balance of the team in 
favor of attack, increases the likelihood of scoring a goal; but also increases the 
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likelihood of conceding a goal. As long as an athlete lives in bad faith, and aspires to 
produce a peak performance in every competitive event (here facticity is affirmed as 
being transcendence), performance corrections in the form of choking (Baumeister, 
1984), catastrophe effects (Fazey & Hardy, 1988), and yips etc. are inevitable.  
Whilst negative performance corrections might appear to have little value, 
Vealey and Chase (2008) suggest otherwise: 
Successful people often reduce their attention because they have no reason to 
change strategies or standards. Thus self-correcting spirals are more beneficial 
than upwards spirals because a person who analyses performance can make 
adjustments in future efforts and reverse the previous decrease (or increase) in 
performance (p. 95). 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have considered some of the implications of W. Powers 
(1973, 1991) control theory and dynamic systems approaches for our understanding 
of peak performance and performance variation in sport. Cybernetic models of self-
regulation and dynamic system approaches offer the complimentary principles of 
feedback and self-organization (Carver & Scheier, 2002); both of which form the 
theoretical basis of correction theory. More importantly, we believe that the holistic 
notion of dynamic balance, as outlined in this paper, offers researchers a basis on 
which to explore performance variation in sport with regard to its interrelation to the 
person. When judged from this perspective, peak performance is not viewed as an end 
in itself, but part of an ongoing dynamic process. Rather than viewing the inevitability 
of performance variation as a defeatist position, we believe that embracing its reality 
will paradoxically free athletes and those who support them, to work towards a higher 
frequency of peak performances in their sport. As M. A. Powers (1994) observed: 
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“variability…(is) the essence of behavior: the phenomenon to be explained, not 
explained away” (p. 1). 
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